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THE SUSPECT AND THE GRAND JURY: A NEED FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
Marshall F. Newman*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUES ARE JOINED
In United States v. Mandujano,I the Supreme Court, while osten-
sibly reaffirming the proposition that the fifth amendment does not
insulate a person charged with perjury from the prosecution's intro-
duction of his false statements, has sanctioned the use of the grand
jury as a subterfuge for circumventing the constitutional proscrip-
tion against compulsory self-incrimination.
Mandujano, a bartender in San Antonio, Texas, suspected of
dealing in narcotics, was contacted by federal agents who provided
him with money to make a heroin purchase. Although willing to
complete the transaction, Mandujano was unable to reach his sup-
plier, and consequently returned the advance to the agent. This
investigative strategy was abandoned, but six weeks after the
aborted transaction, Mandujano was subpoenaed to testify before a
federal grand jury investigating area drug traffic.
Prior to initiating his examination, the federal prosecutor warned
the witness that a response was required except where the answer
would incriminate him "in the commission of a crime;"' 2 he was
further informed that he could retain counsel, but that counsel
* A.B., Brandeis University, 1971; J.D., Boston College, 1975. Staff Law Clerk, United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Richmond, Virginia.
1. 96 S. Ct. 1768 (1976).
2. Id. at 1772.
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would not be allowed inside the grand jury room. The prosecutor
then proceeded to question Mandujano about his familiarity with
the local narcotics trade. While he admitted to having knowledge
of activity which transpired at an earlier time, he insisted that he
was unaware of current operations, and he specifically denied hav-
ing offered to procure heroin for the special agent.4
Mandujano was subsequently charged in a two-count indictment
with attempting to distribute heroin' and willfully and knowingly
making a false material declaration to the grand jury., Entertaining
a defense motion to suppress, the district court, finding that Man-
dujano was questioned "with an eye to possible prosecution," ruled
that a fuller explanation of his rights before the grand jury was
constitutionally required and accordingly held the false statements
to be inadmissible.' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
3. Id. The following exchange reflects the full extent of the warnings given the witness:
Q: Now, you are required to answer all the questions that I ask you except for the
ones that you feel would tend to incriminate you. Do you understand that?
A: Do I answer all the questions you ask?
Q: You have to answer all the questions except for those you think will incriminate
you in the commission of a crime. Is that clear?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You don't have to answer questions which would incriminate you. All other ques-
tions you have to answer openly and truthfully. And, of course, if you do not answer
those questions truthfully, in other words if you lie about certain questions, you could
possibly be charged with perjury ...
United States v. Rangel, 365 F. Supp. 155, 160 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (Rangel and Mandujano
were consolidated cases).
Q: Have you discussed your presence here with anybody?
A: My wife.
Q: Have you contacted a lawyer in this matter?
A: No, sir, I haven't.Q: I take that to mean then that you do not wish the services of a lawyer here today?
A: I don't have one. I don't have the money to get one.
Q: Well, if you would like to have a lawyer, he cannot be inside this room. He can
only be outside. You would be free to consult with him if you so choose. Now, if during
the course of this investigation, the questions that we ask you, if you feel like you would
like to have a lawyer outside to talk to, let me know.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is that clear?
A. (Nod affirmative).
Id. at 162 n.7.
4. Mandujano's testimony is set out in 365 F. Supp. at 157-58 n.1.
5. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1970).
6. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1623 (1970).
7. 365 F. Supp. at 164.
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arguing that the investigation, as it related to Mandujano, had
progressed beyond a stage of a general inquiry and had focused upon
his criminal conduct, affirmed the decision of the lower court.8
The Supreme Court reversed.' It reasoned that (1) the public
has a right to every person's evidence; (2) the public's right is
limited only by the witness' right to refrain from self-incrimination;
and (3) where potentially incriminating evidence is sought to be
elicited, the witness must insist upon his right, whereupon the
prosecution may either choose to forego the particular line of
questioning or pursue the interrogation further by successfully
procuring for the witness a grant of immunity. Since Mandujano
sought to deflect the grand jurors' attention through deceit rather
than insisting upon his constitutional right (which clearly applied
to this portion of Mandujano's examination)," he committed per-
8. United States v. Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. 96 S. Ct. 1768 (1976).
10. The prosecutor sought to elicit testimony concerning the attempted narcotics purchase
six weeks earlier:
Q: Have you ever talked with anybody about selling it?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you sure of that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, no one has ever come up to you and wanted to buy heroin?
A: No, sir.
Q: And you have never told anybody that you would try to get heroin to sell to them?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, you can say here today that you have not discussed the sale of heroin with
anybody in the last year.
A: I don't understand you, sir.
Q: Have you talked to anybody about selling heroin to them during the last year?
A: No, sir.
Q: You are sure about that?
A: I just, you know, I discuss it, you know, when we buy it, you know, to fix it just,
you know.
Q: Has anyone ever asked you if they could buy an ounce of heroin or more from you?
A: No, sir.
Q: Let me ask you once again, Mr. Mandujano, have you ever talked to anybody
about selling them heroin in the last year?
A: No, sir.
Q: No one has ever given you any money-
A: No.
Q: -to go buy them heroin?
A: No, sir . . ..
Q: In other words, if you had $650 right now. ..
A: Yes, sir.
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jury, and the fifth amendment does not preclude the prosecution's
introduction of perjurious statements." Aside from the questionable
fairness of the prosecution's tactics in interrogating Mandujano in
this manner," the decision is consistent with prior Supreme Court
pronouncements relating to perjury.
Nevertheless, in the course of its opinion, the Court seemingly
felt that a grand jury witness need not be warned of his constitu-
tional privilege 3 and apparently indicated that the right to counsel
does not attach to any such witness. 4 This article will first examine
the potential for abuse created by Mandujano, and will then con-
trast the Court's rationale with other decisions recognizing parallel
rights at other stages of the criminal process.
A grand jury proceeding qualifies as a "criminal case" for pur-
poses of the fifth amendment,'" even though no formal charges have
Q: . .. [d]o you think you would be able to purchase an ounce of heroin?
365 F. Supp. at 157 n.1. There is no doubt that a claim of fifth amendment privilege could
have been validly asserted.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S.
64 (1969); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911).
12. The district court felt that the "questioning of the defendants before the grand jury
smacks of entrapment." 365 F. Supp. at 158. The court of appeals agreed, stating that the
"questioning was primarily baiting Mandujano to commit perjury," as the Government knew
full well that a truthful response would have caused him to confess a crime. 496 F.2d at 1055.
It is clear that the questioning was aimed at incriminating the witness; he was asked about
heroin purchases which he made rather than being asked about heroin dealers known to him.
Further, since no new evidence was elicited through the questioning the unfolding of subse-
quent events demonstrated that sufficient evidence already existed to indict Mandujano for
the substantive narcotics offense. Thus, it would seem that the prosecution was seeking either
a binding admission of guilt or, in the alternative, to invite a further violation of law. While
it is doubtful that an entrapment defense could have been asserted successfully (see Hampton
v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976)), it is here that the specter of fundamental unfairness
is raised by this prosecutorial action. Perhaps, as Justice Brennan suggests, the prosecutorial
action will vitiate the willfullness of Mandujano's false testimony and will thus make difficult
the Government's task of establishing this element of the statutory offense. 96 S. Ct. at 1654
(concurring opinion).
13. See 96 S. Ct. at 1781 n.1. It is submitted that the warning given this witness (see note
3 supra), to which the Court seemed to attach some weight, was tantamount to no warning
at all. A perusal of the warning shows that its emphasis was aimed at compelling full disclo-
sure, and did not attempt to define or delimit the concept of self-incrimination. It is con-
tended that if this warning was deemed adequate by the Court, then a record totally devoid
of a Miranda-type warning would nevertheless compel the same result.
14. 96 S. Ct. at 1779.
15. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
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been brought against the subpoenaed witness.'" It has been held,
however, that one who anticipates questions concerning his or her
own criminal involvement may not assert a blanket privilege; in-
stead, the privilege may be raised only in response to particular
questions. 7 Moreover, the privilege must be asserted if it is to be
preserved.', Once the incriminating response has been made, the
privilege is deemed to have been waived.'9 An indictment based
upon evidence so obtained is clearly valid.2 Further, the grand jury
testimony will, of course, be admissible at trial if the witness is
subsequently charged with a crime.2'
While it is clear that a person who has been formally charged is
better able to resist self-incrimination because he is aware of the
charges against him and is much more likely to have sought legal
counsel who has explained the scope of his fifth amendment protec-
tion,22 the Supreme Court adheres to the view that the mere fact
that a witness is a suspect does not relieve him of the duty to testify,
nor does his appearance preclude the grand jury from subsequently
indicting him.2 Thus, the indicted witness can resist, but the person
already under suspicion, who has not been indicted, must, without
the benefit of counsel, respond to questions which might furnish the
government with damaging evidence admissible at trial, remain
16. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 120 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1941); O'Connell v. United
States, 40 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 667 (1930). See also 8 WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 2268 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
18. Garner v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1178 (1976); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424,
427 (1943).
19. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). The witness also runs the risk of falling
prey to the rule that "where criminating facts have been voluntarily revealed, the privilege
cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details." Id. at 373.
20. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339
(1958).
21. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2363 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
22. See 96 S. Ct. at 1786 (Brennan, J., concurring). It has been held that the person
indicted may successfully avoid even the duty to appear before the grand jury. See United
States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v.
Roth, 208 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1953). See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 257-59 (2d ed. 1961); 8
WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2363 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Note, Self-Incrimination Before a Fed-
eral Grand Jury, 45 IowA L. REV. 564 (1960).
23. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1972). A minority of states would grant a
motion to quash an indictment based upon self-incriminating grand jury testimony and the
"fruits" of that testimony. See cases cited in Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand
Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189, 191 n.12 (1966).
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silent and risk contempt or rest upon his layman's understanding
of his right to avoid self-incrimination. Had the grand jury main-
tained its traditional role in our legal system as "a shield against
arbitrary or oppressive action, by insuring that serious criminal ac-
cusations will be brought only upon the considered judgment of a
representative body of citizens . ,'2 the necessity of warning the
witness of his rights would be greatly diminished. However, it has
been stated that the grand jury's "decision to indict or not is usually
a rubber stamp of what the prosecutor has already determined, "'25
and that "[any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can
indict anybody at any time for almost anything before any grand
jury. ' 2 Thus, if the defendant is not accorded adequate procedural
protection, the grand jury can be utilized as a most effective discov-
ery tool, notwithstanding constitutional and statutory prohibi-
tions.27 As pointed out in Michigan v. Tucker,2 the fifth amendment
right at trial would be an empty one indeed if its force could be
circumvented by this type of prosecutorial action at the "pre-
indictment" stage.
II. THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The court rejected the proposition that Miranda21 warnings were
applicable to this situation because of the "marked contrasts be-
tween a grand jury investigation and custodial interrogation."," Fur-
ther, it emphasized the technical inapplicability to a grand jury
proceeding of the Miranda warnings concerning the right to remain
silent. While the detainee has an absolute right to refuse to respond
to police interrogation, and by indicating a desire to remain silent
may force the police to stop questioning him, the grand jury witness
24. 96 S. Ct. at 1774.
25. Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1966).
26. Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972), quoted in United States
v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c) severely limits the prosecution's discovery rights. See Tigar &
Levy, The Grand Jury as the New Inquisition, 50 MICH. ST. B.J. 693, 700 (1971).
28. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The four-part warning required by Miranda
before a suspect may be subjected to custodial interrogation consists of the following: (a) you
have the right to remain silent; (b) anything that you say may be used against you; (c) you
have a right to an attorney and to have him present; and (d) if you cannot afford an attorney,
we will appoint one. Id. at 479.
30. 96 S. Ct. at 1778.
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has only the right to avoid self-incrimination and must respond to
the succeeding question.3 '
It is clear that the main thrust of Miranda is to obviate the effect
of the compulsion exerted by police where a defendant is being
questioned while in custody or "otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way. 32 Nevertheless, the Miranda Court
also realized that the compulsion is often psychological rather than
physical33 and that the goal of its decision was to "insure that the
statements were truly the product of free choice" 3 by informing the
suspect of his fifth amendment privilege in a situation which is
"inherently compelling. '3'
While it cannot be disputed seriously that "the compulsion to
speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater
than in courts or other official investigations where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery, '36 it
is equally true that the grand jury room is a coercive atmosphere for
the solitary witness. The witness is confronted with a three-pronged
compulsion: (1) that insistence upon his right to remain silent might
create the inference of guilt;37 (2) that an invalid claim of privilege
might result in a contempt charge; and (3) that failure to be truthful
can result in a perjury prosecution. In the stationhouse, one must
be warned of his fifth amendment rights because of the presumed
compulsion exerted by the interrogators. It would follow, therefore,
that warnings should be given in the grand jury room where there
are real legal sanctions which necessarily effect the voluntariness of
any response to an incriminating question.
The fifth amendment guarantees "the right of a person to remain
silent [in response to incriminating questions] unless he chooses to
31. Id. at 1779. The Court seemingly attached significance to the warning given
Mandujano. See note 3 supra. It is submitted, as the lower courts found, that the warnings
did little to convey to the witness his fifth amendment rights, but rather emphasized the need
to answer every question truthfully. See also note 13 supra.
32. 384 U.S. at 445.
33. Id. at 448.
34. Id. at 457.
35. Id. at 467.
36. Id. at 461.
37. See Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189, 197 (1966). See-
also The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 222-23 (1964).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." :" The Supreme
Court has defined the constitutional standard for waiver of such a
guarantee as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." 9 Before admitting a statement rendered
in the stationhouse, where the right to remain silent is absolute, not
only do courts require a showing that the right was made known to
the suspect, they also demand compliance with procedures intended
to demonstrate affirmatively that waiver of that right was both
unequivocal and voluntary." Should we allow the summoning of a
suspect before the grand jury-where his right to remain silent is
tempered by the public's countervailing right to every person's evi-
dence and where he faces the additional hazard of legal sanctions
for wrongful invocation of that right-to extract damaging testi-
mony from his own mouth without first explaining to that witness
the nature and scope of his right, and then state in retrospect that
the witness voluntarily abandoned his fifth amendment protection?
To accept this is to tolerate the "subversion of the adversary pro-
cess."
41
To require that a warning be given to the grand jury witness who
is suspect does not place an excessively onerous burden upon
prosecutors. If it impedes the extraction of incriminating data, so
be it;42 such a result would be consistent with at least the spirit of
the fifth amendment. However, it is doubtful that the majority of
those subpoenaed would be entitled to that right, as most grand jury
witnesses are not "suspects," de facto defendants or the objects of
38. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
39. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (emphasis added). See also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
40. Even where the stationhouse suspect is warned of his rights, the Government has a
heavy burden of showing that waiver was informed and voluntary. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966). See, e.g., United States v. Guzman-Guzman, 488 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.
1974). Compliance with the mandate of Miranda does not terminate inquiry into the issue of
voluntariness. Id. Nor will they end their inquiry when presented with a written waiver of
rights form. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1006 (1968). Instead, courts will scrutinize the individual facts of the particular case.
See, e.g., Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966). Does it follow, therefore, that
in the grand jury situation, where failure to claim the privilege will invariably be deemed a
waiver, that the courts should demand that the right to withhold response to an incriminating
question be fully explained to the grand jury's suspect?
41. 96 S. Ct. at 1788 (Brennan, J., concurring).
42. See id. n.17.
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a prosecutorial focus.4 3 Moreover, several courts, pursuant to various
configurations, have for years required that the witness be afforded
adequate warnings in a situation where prosecution was either con-
templated by the government or where sufficient facts existed for
the issuance of the indictment when the witness/suspect was
called.44
Ill. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Court, finding that no criminal proceedings had yet been
instituted against Mandujano' and relying upon In re Groban,"
rejected the notion that a witness even in the position of a virtual
defendant should be entitled to the assistance of counsel.
4 7
Groban concerned the interrogation of a witness by a state fire
marshal who was fulfilling his statutory duty to investigate the
cause of fires. The majority felt that the proceedings did not consti-
tute a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the sixth amend-
ment. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Black expressed his belief that
[t]he Due Process Clause requires that a person interrogated be
allowed to use legal counsel whenever he is compelled to give testi-
mony to law enforcement officers which may be instrumental in his
prosecution and conviction .... "I
43. See text accompanying notes 91-98 infra discussing the facts which would entitle a
person to the protections examined in this article.
44. See, e.g. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); United States v. Di
Michele, 375 F.2d 959 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967); United States v. Luxenberg,
374 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir. 1967); Kitchell v. United States, 354 F.2d 715, 720 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966); United States v. Orta, 253 F.2d 312 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 905 (1958). See also cases cited in United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. 1778, 1788
n.18 (1976).
45. The Court cited Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), as authority for using this cut-
off date as the triggering mechanism for sixth amendment rights.
46. 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (witness has no right to counsel at an investigatory proceed-
ing).
47. 96 S. Ct. at 1779. The Court, having previously ruled Miranda inapplicable as it
pertained to warning the grand jury witness of his fifth amendment rights, logically rejected
the proposition embraced by Miranda that the presence of an attorney is necessary to protect
the witness' right to be free from self-incrimination. Id. at n.6.
48. 352 U.S. at 344 (Black, J., dissenting).
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The pressures operating against the will of the witness clearly are
greater in the grand jury room and it might well be presumed that
a prosecutor can more skillfully frame questions aimed at eliciting
incriminating data. Moreover, it has been suggested that Groban
has lost its vitality in light of more recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements in the area of criminal procedure.49 Two Justices of the
five-member Groban plurality subscribed to the view by stating:
We are not justified in invalidating this Ohio statute on the assump-
tion that people called before the Fire Marshal would not be aware
of their privilege not to respond to questions the answers to which
may tend to incriminate. At a time when this privilege has attained
the familiarity of the comic strips, the assumption of ignorance about
the privilege by witnesses called before the Fire Marshal is too far-
fetched an assumption on which to invalidate legislation."
A decade later, the Miranda Court expressly rejected that assess-
ment:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system
of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warn-
ing as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause
to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his
rights without a warning being given. 5'
Three other Justices attached controlling weight to the fact that
the state inquiry was nothing more than an administrative proceed-
ing, not a criminal trial, wherein no criminal liability was deter-
mined.52 It is unfortunate that the Mandujano Court relied upon so
questionable a precedent as Groban, where three Justices drew a
"mechanistic distinction '5 3 as a basis for their decision and two
others relied upon the since-discarded notion that no one need be
informed of basic constitutional rights.54 Pursuant to any one of
49. Note, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE L.J. 97, 126.
50. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 337 (1957).
51. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468.
52. In re Groban, 352 U.S. at 332.
53. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
54. See Note, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE L.J. 97, 127.
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three avenues of constitutional analysis, existing precedent seem-
ingly would mandate the right to counsel in this situation.
A. Grand Jury Examination as a Critical Stage''
[T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against
the state at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court
or out, where counsel's absence might derogate the accused's right to
a fair trial.5"
Therefore, each court must "analyze whether potential substantial
prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confronta-
tion and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. '5 1 7 Thus,
the Supreme Court has recognized the right to counsel at pretrial
arraignment where certain rights may be lost,5" at a pretrial line-up "
and at a preliminary hearing." While it is technically true that the
suspect called before the grand jury is not an "accused" or a "defen-
dant," the unfettered prosecutorial discretion as to the timing of an
indictment"' has caused numerous courts to recognize that such a
person is a "potential defendant, "'2 a "de facto defendant""' or one
"virtually in the position of a defendant." 4 Any formalistic rejection
of this notion would lose sight of the fact that "potential substantial
prejudice to the defendant's rights inheres in the particular (grand
jury) confrontation" 5 and that the assistance of counsel would help
the witness avoid that prejudice by advising him when to interpose
his fifth amendment privilege.
Professor Samuel Dash urges that the characterization of the pre-
liminary hearing as a "critical stage" in Coleman requires that the
55. See generally Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 Am. CRIM. L. REV.
807 (1972).
56. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
57. Id. at 227.
58. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
59. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
60. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
61. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Pepe, 367 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (D. Conn. 1973).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
897 (1955).
64. United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967).
65. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
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grand jury interrogation of a potential defendant be similarly desig-
nated. " Theoretically, both proceedings are aimed at a determina-
tion of probable cause. At the preliminary hearing, the defendant
cannot be called as a witness; yet, because of considerations con-
cerning trial, the presence of his attorney is necessary to keep ques-
tioning within proper bounds. A fortiori, the grand jury is a critical
stage because there the potential defendant can be called as a wit-
ness, and an incriminating response to an improper question will be
frozen for use at trial.
Moreover, recognition of the line-up as a critical stage further
underscores the need to extend the right of counsel to the grand jury
situation. In the secrecy of the grand jury room, just as in the police
station, the proceeding is under the total control of a law enforce-
ment official who may and occasionally does ask prejudicial ques-
tions, 7 aimed at extracting incriminating statements from a de-
fendant. The Wade Court was wary of proceedings which could
"seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.""8 If it is recog-
nized that a fair trial includes the defendant's right to stay off the
witness stand, then the presence of an attorney is needed to deter
the prosecutor from achieving indirectly what he cannot do directly.
B. The Grand Jury and Escobedo5
Where the potential defendant is called before the grand jury, it
can be argued convincingly that "the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect."7' It is submitted that considerations similar to
those which compelled the court to extend the right to counsel in
Escobedo are equally applicable to the grand jury witness under
prosecutorial "focus."
There are three aspects of Escobedo which are analogous to the
grand jury proceeding. First, in Escobedo, the suspect had been
"taken into police custody." While the grand jury witness is not
66. Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 807 (1972).
67. Id. and notes 41-42 supra.
68. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
69. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
70. Id. at 490. It should be recalled that the Miranda Court announced that that decision
did not affect its resolve to "adhere to Escobedo." 384 U.S. at 444.
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technically in custody, he is nevertheless subject to the same physi-
cal constraints; he can't "walk out the door," 7' nor can he terminate
the questioning. Moreover, the compulsions to speak are at least as
coercive as the mere fact of custody where one may merely remain
mute. Second, the police were carrying out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements from Esco-
bedo. The prosecutor has the same aim when he calls the suspect
in a grand jury proceeding; he is interrogating a witness who under
most circumstances must answer, and he has been better trained to
engage in this process. Finally, the Escobedo Court emphasized that
the suspect had not been warned effectively of his limited right to
remain silent. Thus, it would seem that the focus test of Escobedo
also requires that the right to counsel attach. "[W]hen the process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the
accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary sys-
tem begins to operate, and . . . the accused must be permitted to
consult with his lawyer."72
C. Counsel to Preserve Fifth Amendment Rights
As the plurality in Mandujano properly noted, the sixth amend-
ment was not implicated in Miranda; rather, the right to counsel
"was fashioned to secure the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege
in a setting thought inherently coercive. 73 Even if one were not to
embrace the writer's view that the grand jury setting is similarly
coercive, it is indisputable that the fifth amendment right is more
elusive in the latter atmosphere. The need for counsel in the grand
jury room was artfully explained by Justice Black:
It is said that a witness can protect himself against some of the many
abuses possible in a secret interrogation by asserting the privilege
against self-incrimination. But this proposition collapses under any-
thing more than the most superficial consideration. The average wit-
ness has little if any idea when or how to raise any of his constitu-
tional privileges . . . .[I]n view of the intricate possibilities of
waiver which surround the privilege he may easily unwittingly waive
it.74
71. 378 U.S. at 479.
72. Id. at 492.
73. United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. 1768, 1779 n.6 (1976).
74. In re Groban, 352 U.S. at 345-46 (Black, J., dissenting), quoted in United States v.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
If the fifth amendment is to have any vitality within the context of
the grand jury, the right to counsel must be recognized as a requisite
for active exercise of that right.
D. Right to Counsel: Inside or Outside
Under the present federal practice, the attorney is not allowed
inside the grand jury room; if the witness desires to confer with
counsel, he must leave the room.75 The effective implementation of
the right to counsel would require the abandonment of this rule.
Since the attorney's role is restricted to advice as to the assertion
of the fifth amendment privilege, the attorney must be allowed to
hear each question within the context of the questions that preceded
it if the advice is to be meaningful. Moreover, the right might well
be diminished where the attorney offers advice based upon the wit-
ness' rendition of the question rather than in response to the ques-
tion itself. Additionally, from the perspective of pure administrative
economy, it would be wise to allow the attorney inside the grand
jury room since the disruptive elements of the present procedure
would be eliminated. 76
The rationale most often proposed to justify exclusion of the at-
torney from the grand jury room is that it is necessary for the preser-
vation of the secrecy of the proceedings. It is questionable whether
this view is valid, since a witness, especially a witness who will be
indicted, will relate the questions to his attorney-either during the
course of the grand jury inquiry or while preparing a defense for
trial. 77 It has been suggested, however, that the underlying consider-
ation is not to maintain secrecy, but to avoid providing a potential
defendant with a mechanism for discovery.75 Given the recent liber-
alization of discovery rules,7" exclusion of the attorney seems to be
Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. at 1790 (Brennan, J., concurring). This view was restated recently in
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975). See also The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78
HARV. L. REV. 143, 221 (1964).
75. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d). See also 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 105
(1969).
76. See generally Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 1 (1972).
77. Id. See also Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
807, 818-20 (1972), where he attacks the entire concept of grand jury secrecy as an antiquated
legal fiction.
78. Id. at 824.
79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
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ineffective. Additionally, the exclusion seems patently unfair, since
a paramount purpose in summoning the potential defendant is to
discover any anticipated defense.
E. Counsel and the Indigent Grand Jury Witness
Mandujano was advised by the prosecutor that he was free to
retain counsel if he desired to do so. 8 The plurality viewed this
warning as an accurate statement of existing law.' By refusing to
recognize a constitutional right to counsel in the grand jury, the due
process and equal protection clauses are rendered inapplicable" as
they pertain to the indigent defendant. Thus, the type of witness
least equipped to deal with the nuances of the right to avoid self-
incrimination will be totally foreclosed from obtaining legal counsel.
However, if the witness/suspect's right to counsel before the grand
jury is recognized as being a constitutional requirement, it then
becomes inescapable that if the witness cannot afford counsel, one
must be appointed. 3 "Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time
of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford
one would [not] be . . .supportable by reason or logic."' 4
IV. FASHIONING A REMEDY
In United States v. Lawn," several defendants who had been
charged with a criminal information were subpoenaed to appear
before a grand jury investigating activities upon which the informa-
tions were based. The subsequent indictments were challenged on
80. See note 3 supra.
81. United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. at 1779.
82. In the area of the rights of the criminal defendant, a state, where it provides a certain
procedural mechanism, may not withhold that right from certain persons because of their
inability to pay for that right. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956). The equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has, of course, been recognized as being
applicable to the federal government through the fifth amendment.
83. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
84. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 472-73.
85. 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub noma. United States v. Roth, 208
F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1953). See also United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955); Maffie
v. United States, 209 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1954); Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th
Cir. 1952); United States v. Edgerton, 80 F. 374 (D. Mont. 1897).
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the basis that the defendants were compelled to testify without
receiving adequate warnings of their right to remain silent. The
district court ordered the indictments quashed because compelling
the defendant to appear before the grand jury invalidated the in-
dictment in the same way that compelling the defendant to assume
the witness stand would invalidate the trial. 86 By logical extension,
one might argue that the same reasoning would require the quashing
of an indictment based upon the grand jury testimony of a witness
upon whom the government has focused its investigation.
It would, however, seem doubtful that a proper remedy would be
to quash the indictment. Historically, grand jurors have been al-
lowed to draw upon all types of information. It may be based upon
hearsay87 or upon illegally-seized evidence.8" Since the grand jury is
not adjudicating the issue of guilt or innocence, it would seem that
to quash is a radical step which would too often preclude the prose-
cution of clear criminal violations because of the indiscretion of a
prosecutor. It would obviously be a useless exercise to require the
government to reconvene a grand jury and again present all the
evidence save for the incriminating remark.
A more rational remedy would be to prohibit the introduction of
an incriminating statement at trial. This approach would seem to
strike a satisfactory balance between the defendant's fifth amend-
ment rights and the public's interest in the enforcement of the crim-
inal laws. Just as the motion to suppress may be utilized to vindi-
cate the constitutional rights of the victim of an illegal search, a
similar motion should be entertained where the government has
wrongfully invaded the witness' right to resist compelled self-
incrimination. The Supreme Court has expressed a view that the
use of the exclusionary rule should be restricted "to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served."8 9 The availability of the exclusionary rule would insure that
any witness/suspect called before the grand jury would be satisfac-
torily warned of his rights and would be provided with counsel to
protect these rights. As the Court has recognized, "the need for
86. 115 F. Supp. at 677.
87. United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
88. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
89. Id. at 348.
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deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are
strongest where the government's unlawful conduct would result in
the imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim."9
V. WHEN DOES THE RIGHT ATTACH?
Several courts have recognized the necessity to warn grand jury
witnesses of their fifth amendment rights when they have achieved
a certain status. Some jurisdictions have required that an indicted
witness be advised of his right against self-incrimination and that
he affirmatively waive that right before any questions may be asked
of him by the prosecutor. 1 A more limited number of courts have
held that the probable or de facto defendant, one whose prosecution
is contemplated but who has not been formally charged, is entitled
to a similar admonition,9" while they have denied the same right to
one who is merely a "possible defendant."9 3
It is clear that the de facto defendant should be afforded the same
treatment as his de jure counterpart, since important rights should
not be subject to the power of the prosecutor to manipulate the
timing of the indictment.94 Further, the application of this probable-
possible dichotomy is susceptible to criticism on the ground that so
important a right should not depend upon so precarious a distinc-
tion; what quantum of evidence is required to change one's status
from possible defendant to probable defendant? Moreover, where
such distinctions are made, "the witness' rights depend on the pros-
ecutor's subjective intent."9
A more rational approach is suggested by Justice Brennan in his
concurring opinion: where probable cause, measured by objective
standards, exists for the indictment of a particular suspect, he must
be informed of his right to remain silent when asked incriminating
questions, and he should not be interrogated until he has affirma-
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 80 F. Supp. 979, 981 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
897 (1955).
93. See Comment, The Grand Jury Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 62 Nw.
U.L. REV. 207, 222-26 (1967).
94. Note, Self-Incrimination Before a Federal Grand Jury, 45 IowA L. REV. 564, 574 (1960).
95. Comment, The Grand Jury Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 62 Nw. U.L.
REV. 207, 223 (1967).
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tively demonstrated his desire to waive that right." In addition, he
should be allowed the presence of counsel to explain the applicabil-
ity of that right to any particular line of questioning. Such a stan-
dard would obviate the need to speculate as to the intent of the
prosecutor or to apply standards which are not susceptible to precise
definition. No hardship would result to the government in terms of
"constitutionally permissible criteria."97 If such a standard were to
be applied and enforced through implementation of an exclusionary
rule, prosecutors would learn to resolve any doubt in favor of the
putative defendant. 8
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED WARNINGS
The Mandujano decision correctly holds that one who testifies
falsely under oath cannot seek to exclude his statements from a
subsequent perjury prosecution. However, the Court went beyond
that basic proposition and intimated that the grand jury witness
need not be advised of his fifth amendment rights nor need he be
provided with counsel, even where probable cause to indict the sus-
pect exists prior to the issuance of the subpoena." The opinion
indicates that had Mandujano incriminated himself, those state-
ments would have been admissible at trial.
This article has demonstrated that such a view is inconsistent
with the protection afforded by the fifth amendment to a person
suspected of criminal involvement. The grand jury room exudes
pressures on a witness which are as great, if not identical, to those
created by custodial interrogation. Thus, it would seem that a
Miranda warning of the right not to speak is equally necessary
96. United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. at 1787 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. Id. at n.15.
98. Justice Brennan expressed his concern about the need to protect the "possible" de-
fendant whose testimony before the grand jury furnishes sufficient evidence to satisfy the
objective probable cause standard. Id. It is suggested that such a situation is unlikely to arise.
As stated, close cases will be resolved in favor of the witness. In those cases wherein the
probable cause standard is not even approached, the dangers encountered by Mandujano will
not be present; the less the prosecutor knows, the more difficult it is for him to frame an
incriminating question which will not immediately alert even the most ignorant witness that
he need not respond to the question.
99. Probable cause to indict necessarily existed at the time Mandujano was subpoenaed,
as while he feigned ignorance, the grand jury nevertheless indicted on the substantive drug
charge.
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within the context of the grand jury. Moreover, since that right is
not absolute before the grand jury, and since severe sanctions are
available for wrongful invocation of that right, the presence of coun-
sel would seem necessary for its meaningful protection. Alterna-
tively, because in such a situation, the grand jury is a critical prose-
cutorial stage and because the government has focused upon a par-
ticular suspect, the sixth amendment seemingly should attach inde-
pendently. To make such representation meaningful, counsel
should be allowed in the courtroom, and the availability of counsel
should not be made contingent upon financial capability.
Thus, in the interest of effectuating the purpose and spirit of the
fifth amendment, as well as achieving consistency with other Su-
preme Court decisions in this area, the author suggests that where
probable cause exists to indict a suspect, he should be given the
following warnings prior to his being interrogated before the grand
jury:
(1) You need not respond to any question where your answer will in
any way implicate you in the commission of a crime.
(2) Your refusal to answer an incriminating question will not be
held against you.' 0
(3) If, however, you do incriminate yourself, that statement will be
used against you.
(4) You are entitled to have an attorney present, and you may con-
sult with him before responding to any question.
(5) If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent
you.
Any incriminating evidence elicited without this admonition should
be vulnerable to suppression at a subsequent trial. The integrity of
the adversarial process will tolerate nothing less.
100. Such a warning would be an accurate reflection of the current status of the law. See
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
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